When the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (the “CPSO”) opens an investigation into a registered physician, the College’s investigators have statutory authority to demand the records that bear on the investigation. The physician has a corresponding statutory duty to cooperate and produce those records. The framework is straightforward in principle. Two physicians who refused to produce records during the COVID-19 era discovered how robustly the framework operates in practice.
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v Kilian, 2024 ONPSDT 23, was a joint preliminary motion decided by the Ontario Physicians and Surgeons Discipline Tribunal (the “OPSDT”) on October 16, 2024. Two physicians, Dr. Rochagné Kilian and Dr. Sonja Sophia Kustka, brought motions to resist the CPSO’s investigative demands for patient records. They argued, among other things, that the production demands violated section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The OPSDT dismissed the motions. The reasoning, distilled: a physician does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records that belong, as a matter of personal health information law, to the patient. The privacy interest in patient records runs to the patient as the data subject, not to the physician as the record custodian. Section 8 of the Charter accordingly does not shield the physician from producing the records to the regulator.
The decision is doctrinally significant for several reasons. It articulates with unusual clarity the custodian-subject distinction that underlies the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (PHIPA) framework. It applies the Charter section 8 reasonable-expectation-of-privacy framework to a regulatory production demand and explains why the physician does not have standing to invoke section 8 against a demand for the patient’s records. It is part of a now-substantial body of COVID-era physician discipline jurisprudence that includes Trozzi, Luchkiw, and several other matters. And it sits at the front end of a procedural arc that has since produced findings of professional misconduct and substantial penalties for both physicians.
This case comment covers the regulatory framework that produced the CPSO’s investigation, the PHIPA custodian-subject distinction that defeated the Charter section 8 argument, the broader doctrinal architecture of the “ungovernable physician” framework that has emerged from the COVID-era discipline cases, the factual background of each physician’s conduct, the subsequent procedural history through October 2025, and the doctrinal lessons that emerge from the case as a whole.
The regulatory framework
Physician discipline in Ontario is governed by the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 (the “RHPA”), and its accompanying Health Professions Procedural Code (the “HPPC”), which is set out as Schedule 2 to the RHPA. The framework operates as follows:
The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. The CPSO is the self-regulating body for physicians in Ontario. It is established under the Medicine Act, 1991, and operates pursuant to the RHPA. Its core public-protection functions include registration, complaints handling, investigations, and discipline. The CPSO is governed by a Council of physicians and public members.
The Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (the “ICRC”). This is the statutory committee of the CPSO Council that handles complaints and investigations at the front end. Under sections 25 to 26 of the HPPC, the ICRC can investigate, take no action, caution the member, refer the matter to the Discipline Committee (the OPSDT), or take various intermediate actions. Under section 25.4 of the HPPC, the ICRC can impose interim orders restricting practice during an investigation where it forms the opinion that the member’s conduct exposes or is likely to expose patients to harm or injury.
The Ontario Physicians and Surgeons Discipline Tribunal (the “OPSDT”). Formerly called the Discipline Committee, the OPSDT is the independent administrative tribunal that adjudicates allegations of professional misconduct or incompetence referred by the ICRC. The OPSDT operates with its own panel structure, hearing procedures, and reasons-for-decision practice. Decisions of the OPSDT can be appealed to the Divisional Court.
The investigative power under section 76 of the HPPC. When the CPSO opens an investigation, the Registrar may appoint an investigator under section 75 of the HPPC. Section 76 authorizes the investigator to enter the member’s place of practice, examine records, and demand the production of records relevant to the investigation. The member has a corresponding statutory duty to cooperate. A failure to cooperate is itself professional misconduct under section 51 of the HPPC and the Professional Misconduct Regulation under the Medicine Act, 1991.
The section 87 application. Where a member refuses to comply with an investigator’s demand, the CPSO can apply to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice under section 87 of the HPPC for an order compelling compliance. The scope of the section 87 application is narrow. The court’s role is to consider whether the request is within the investigator’s regulatory powers. Constitutional arguments and challenges to the legitimacy of the investigation generally belong before the Discipline Committee first, not before the court on a section 87 application. The Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed this scope in Kilian v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2024 ONCA 52.
The duty of cooperation as the doctrinal anchor. The duty of cooperation runs through the framework. The CPSO’s authority to investigate is the regulatory mechanism that protects the public from unfit practitioners. The duty of cooperation is the operative obligation that makes the regulatory mechanism effective. A physician who refuses to cooperate impairs the regulatory function and exposes the public to risk. The legislature has accordingly built the duty of cooperation into the statutory framework with corresponding sanctions for non-compliance.
The PHIPA custodian-subject distinction
The doctrinal centerpiece of the Kilian motion ruling is the custodian-subject distinction under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sched. A. The distinction is foundational to PHIPA and to Canadian personal health information law generally.
Personal health information. PHIPA defines personal health information broadly to include any identifying information about an individual in oral or recorded form that relates to physical or mental health, family medical history, the provision of health care, payment for health care, donation of body parts or substances, or organ or tissue donation.
The custodian. A health information custodian is defined under section 3 of PHIPA. The category includes physicians, dentists, midwives, hospitals, long-term care homes, pharmacies, laboratories, and various other entities. The custodian is the legal entity that holds personal health information for the purpose of providing health care or related functions. Physicians in clinical practice are custodians of the personal health information of their patients.
The subject (the patient). The individual whose personal health information is collected, used, or disclosed is the data subject. The subject has substantive rights under PHIPA, including the right to access her own personal health information, the right to request correction of inaccuracies, the right to withdraw consent in certain circumstances, and the right to bring complaints to the Information and Privacy Commissioner.
The privacy interest belongs to the subject, not the custodian. This is the core of the Kilian analysis. The privacy interest protected by Canadian law in personal health information runs to the patient. The custodian holds the information in trust, subject to the custodian’s obligations and the patient’s rights. The custodian does not have a privacy interest of its own in the patient’s information.
The Charter section 8 framework requires a reasonable expectation of privacy to engage the protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Where the privacy interest belongs to the patient, the physician cannot assert a reasonable expectation of privacy of her own in the records. The records are not the physician’s personal information. The physician holds them as custodian. The physician’s interest in the records is functional and professional, not personal. The Charter section 8 framework does not protect the custodian against a regulatory production demand for the records of the subject.
The framework parallels other custodian relationships in Canadian law. A bank does not have a section 8 interest in a customer’s account records when those records are subpoenaed by a regulator. A lawyer does not have a section 8 interest in client documents (although the client has solicitor-client privilege, which operates as a separate protection). The custodian-subject distinction is not a novel doctrine; Kilian applies it cleanly in the regulated health professions context.
The patient’s privacy interest is preserved through other mechanisms. A skeptical reader might ask: if the patient is the holder of the privacy interest, what protects the patient when the CPSO investigator obtains the records? Several mechanisms operate:
- The investigative purpose is statutorily defined. Section 75 and 76 of the HPPC limit the investigator’s authority to the investigation purposes.
- The CPSO is itself bound by PHIPA. As a public body that handles personal health information in the course of regulating health professions, the CPSO has its own custodial obligations.
- The records remain confidential to the regulatory process. They are not disclosed publicly unless they form part of a discipline hearing record, and discipline hearings have their own publication and anonymization frameworks.
- The Information and Privacy Commissioner has oversight. Patient complaints about the handling of their personal health information can be brought to the Commissioner.
In short, the patient’s privacy interest is protected by a network of statutory and oversight mechanisms. The physician’s invocation of the patient’s privacy interest as a shield against regulatory cooperation is, in this framework, a misuse of someone else’s right. The patient’s right does not belong to the physician to wield against the regulator.
Charter section 8 in regulatory investigations
The section 8 framework was developed substantially by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145, and has been applied in many subsequent contexts. The framework requires:
- Standing. The person invoking section 8 must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing being searched.
- Reasonableness. Even where section 8 is engaged, the search may be reasonable if it is authorized by law, the law itself is reasonable, and the manner of the search is reasonable.
Where the records sought are records of a regulated professional’s practice, several courts have addressed the section 8 framework. The general line of authority holds:
- Regulatory inspections of business records held by professionals are typically not section 8 protected to the same extent as criminal searches of personal information. Regulated professionals operate under a reduced expectation of privacy in their professional records because regulation is foreseeable and necessary.
- The subject’s privacy interest in personal health information is separately protected by PHIPA and other instruments, but is not engaged by a regulator’s request to the custodian within the scope of the regulator’s mandate.
- The professional’s claim to a privacy interest in patient records as if they were the professional’s own information has been consistently rejected.
The Kilian motion ruling applies these principles to the particular case of a CPSO investigation. The records are not the physician’s personal information. The physician has no reasonable expectation of privacy in them. Section 8 of the Charter is not engaged. The motion fails at the standing threshold without needing to reach the reasonableness analysis.
The decision also addressed the other constitutional arguments raised by the physicians:
- Challenges to the appointment of investigators. The CPSO’s investigator appointments were within the statutory framework. The challenge failed.
- Application of CPSO policies. The policies were lawful and within scope. The challenge failed.
- Freedom of expression under section 2(b). The professional misconduct framework can engage freedom of expression where the conduct alleged includes professional speech, but the framework is calibrated to balance regulatory protection of the public against free expression. The OPSDT was not the forum to address constitutional invalidity of the framework as a whole.
- Constitutionality of vaccine mandates. The vaccine mandates themselves were not before the OPSDT and were not within the OPSDT’s jurisdiction to consider in the context of a production motion in a discipline proceeding.
The OPSDT addressed each argument and rejected each. The cumulative effect was to confirm that the production demands were lawful, the physicians’ refusal to comply was unjustified, and the discipline proceedings could proceed to the merits.
The factual background
The OPSDT motion ruling proceeded against a substantial factual background for each physician. Although the motion itself was procedural, the underlying conduct that triggered the CPSO investigations is part of the public record and bears on the doctrinal significance of the case.
Dr. Rochagné Kilian. Dr. Kilian was a family physician and emergency medicine practitioner based in Owen Sound, Ontario, registered with the CPSO since 2016. She resigned from her emergency physician position at Grey Bruce Health Services in August 2021. In September 2021, the CPSO received a series of complaints. Two members of the public sent the CPSO copies of medical exemptions from the COVID-19 vaccine signed by Dr. Kilian. The exemption documents:
- Did not explain a medical basis for the exemption
- Claimed to cite legal authorities including the Canadian Constitution and the Nuremberg Code
- Stated the exemption was based on “MEDICAL, &/or PSYCHOSOCIAL CONDITION(S)” that would be “ongoing for a minimum of ten year(s)”
- Included an option for a medical exemption from wearing a mask
The CPSO also received information about Dr. Kilian’s public comments on COVID-19 vaccines and the vaccine mandate. She had been an active speaker at rallies opposing public health measures.
In October 2021, the ICRC made an interim order without notice prohibiting Dr. Kilian from providing medical exemptions for COVID-19 vaccines, masks, or testing. The ICRC found that her conduct exposed or was likely to expose patients to harm and that urgent intervention was required. The ICRC concluded that patients would rely on the exemptions to gain access to higher-risk settings without the protection of vaccination, exposing the public to increased COVID-19 transmission risk. The ICRC further concluded that Dr. Kilian was providing exemptions for what appeared to be ideological rather than medical reasons, that the individuals receiving exemptions were not otherwise her patients, and that they were charged fees that far exceeded reasonable medical-note fees.
After the ICRC interim order, the CPSO discovered that Dr. Kilian had continued to issue exemptions through an organization known as White Knight Medical and through a website called Enable Air. The CPSO characterized the Enable Air documents as “legal declarations of noncompliance” and quoted the website’s representation that physician rejection of an exemption application was “next to impossible.” On October 27, 2021, Dr. Kilian’s medical licence was suspended pursuant to a further ICRC interim order.
Dr. Sonja Sophia Kustka. The CPSO received complaints about Dr. Kustka in November and December 2021. The first complaint came from a Girl Guide leader who had received medical exemptions from mask requirements written by Dr. Kustka for two sisters. The leader reported that neither sister had reported any medical condition and that the sisters did not live in proximity to Dr. Kustka’s office. The second complaint related to Dr. Kustka’s alleged use of ivermectin to treat her late mother, who had had COVID-19.
The CPSO opened an investigation into Dr. Kustka’s practice. She, like Dr. Kilian, refused to produce records on jurisdictional and constitutional grounds.
The joint motion. Both physicians were represented by the same counsel and brought their motions to resist the production demands jointly. The motions were heard together by the OPSDT on August 13, 2024, and the joint reasons were released on October 16, 2024 as College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v Kilian, 2024 ONPSDT 23.
The “ungovernable physician” framework
A doctrinally significant development in the COVID-era discipline cases is the articulation of what is sometimes called the “ungovernable physician” framework. The framework holds that a physician who refuses to engage with the regulatory process — who refuses to produce records, refuses to attend interviews, refuses to acknowledge the regulator’s jurisdiction — engages in professional misconduct on that basis alone, independent of any clinical conduct findings.
The doctrine is grounded in the structural logic of self-regulation. The regulated health professions in Ontario operate under a self-regulatory framework in which the College has the statutory authority and obligation to police the profession in the public interest. The framework depends on member cooperation. A physician who systematically refuses to cooperate makes the regulatory framework non-functional in respect of her practice. That refusal is itself a serious professional fault, separate from whatever clinical conduct may also be at issue.
The framework has been applied in several COVID-era cases:
Trozzi. Dr. Mark Raymond Trozzi was the subject of CPSO proceedings arising from his COVID-19-related communications and refusal to cooperate. The OPSDT found professional misconduct and the penalty proceedings produced a revocation of his certificate of registration. The Trozzi case articulated the framework that refusal to engage with the regulator can support revocation as the appropriate penalty even where the clinical conduct findings might otherwise have supported a less severe outcome.
Luchkiw. Dr. Patrick Phillips and Dr. Mark Trozzi were the most prominent cases, but Dr. Crystal Luchkiw was another COVID-era physician whose discipline proceedings produced a substantial suspension. The framework operated similarly.
The Kilian and Kustka proceedings. Both physicians’ subsequent discipline outcomes were grounded substantially in the failure-to-cooperate findings rather than in detailed adjudication of the underlying clinical conduct. The OPSDT was able to find professional misconduct on the cooperation failures alone, which simplified the proceedings significantly.
The framework parallels the “least restrictive order” doctrine in the interim order context. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Kilian v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 2829, confirmed that interim orders under section 25.4 of the HPPC must be the least restrictive that adequately protects the public — but that suspension can be the least restrictive available where the registrant refuses to cooperate. Where lesser orders depend on the registrant’s compliance, and the registrant has refused to comply, suspension is the operationally available least-restrictive option.
The framework, taken together, communicates a clear message to the regulated professions: the duty of cooperation is foundational. Refusal to engage with the regulatory process produces disciplinary consequences that are often more severe than the underlying clinical conduct would otherwise have warranted. The structural integrity of self-regulation is not negotiable.
The procedural arc through October 2025
The October 2024 motion ruling was not the end of the story. The subsequent procedural history is itself instructive.
The Court of Appeal — Kilian v CPSO, 2024 ONCA 52. The Court of Appeal addressed an aspect of the s. 87 framework. Dr. Kilian had argued in a section 87 application that the CPSO had to prove the legality of the underlying investigation before the court could compel production. The Court held that the section 87 application is narrow in scope. The court considers whether the investigator’s request falls within the investigator’s regulatory powers. Constitutional arguments and challenges to the legitimacy of the investigation are matters for the Discipline Committee at first instance, with judicial review available after the administrative process is complete. The Court of Appeal accordingly rejected the attempt to litigate the merits of the investigation at the section 87 stage.
The OPSDT motion ruling — 2024 ONPSDT 23 (October 16, 2024). The case under discussion. Both physicians’ motions to resist production were dismissed. The reasons addressed the Charter section 8 framework, the PHIPA custodian-subject distinction, the investigator-appointment challenges, freedom of expression, and the constitutionality of vaccine mandates. All arguments were rejected.
The OPSDT merits hearing for Dr. Kustka (March 5, 2025). The OPSDT found that Dr. Kustka:
- Engaged in disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional conduct
- Failed to respond appropriately or within a reasonable time to a written inquiry from the CPSO
- Contravened a term, condition or limitation on her certificate of registration
The OPSDT merits hearing for Dr. Kilian (January 22-23, 2025; reasons May 2, 2025). The OPSDT found that Dr. Kilian:
- Engaged in professional misconduct by failing to respond appropriately or within a reasonable time period to a written inquiry by the College
- Failed to cooperate with the College’s investigation
- Engaged in conduct that was disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional
The penalty decisions.
For Dr. Kustka, the penalty decision was released on June 17, 2025.
For Dr. Kilian, the penalty hearing was held on August 15, 2025, and the penalty decision was released on October 22, 2025. The penalty:
- 12-month suspension commencing at 12:01 a.m. on October 23, 2025
- Mandatory participation in and successful completion of the PROBE Ethics & Boundaries program offered by the Centre for Personalized Education for Professionals, at her own expense
- Additional terms, conditions, and limitations on her certificate of registration
The interim order litigation — 2025 ONSC 2829. A parallel piece of the litigation involved the appropriateness of the interim order maintaining the suspension of Dr. Kilian’s licence during the discipline process. The Superior Court addressed the threshold evidence required to establish patient harm under section 25.4 of the HPPC and confirmed that the protective purpose of interim orders supports continued suspension where less restrictive measures are not operationally viable.
The arc as a whole, from October 2021 to October 2025, spans four years of procedural activity. The original ICRC interim order in October 2021 effectively ended Dr. Kilian’s clinical practice. Every subsequent step confirmed that consequence and added further regulatory dispositions. The OPSDT 2024 ONPSDT 23 motion ruling was a critical procedural milestone but not the final disposition; the final dispositions came in 2025.
Doctrinal lessons
The Kilian matter, taken as a whole, stands for several propositions.
Physicians hold patient records as custodians, not as owners. The PHIPA framework establishes the custodian-subject distinction. The patient is the subject and holds the privacy interest. The physician is the custodian and has functional and professional access to the records but not personal ownership of them or a personal privacy interest in them.
Charter section 8 does not shield custodians from regulatory production demands within the regulator’s scope. Where the privacy interest belongs to the subject, the custodian lacks standing under section 8. The physician cannot invoke the patient’s privacy interest as a shield against legitimate regulatory inquiry. The patient’s privacy interest is protected through other mechanisms operating within the regulatory framework.
The duty of cooperation under section 76 of the HPPC is foundational. Failure to cooperate is itself professional misconduct, sanctionable separately from any clinical conduct findings. The duty exists because the regulatory framework cannot function without it.
Constitutional arguments about a regulatory framework belong before the Discipline Committee at first instance. The Court of Appeal in Kilian v CPSO, 2024 ONCA 52, confirmed that the section 87 production application is narrow in scope and that broader constitutional challenges to the framework are properly raised before the Discipline Committee, with judicial review available after the administrative process concludes.
The “ungovernable physician” framework is now well-established. A pattern of refusal to engage with the regulator can support findings of professional misconduct and substantial penalties (including revocation in the most serious cases) on the cooperation failures alone, independent of clinical conduct findings.
Interim orders under section 25.4 of the HPPC must be the least restrictive that adequately protects the public — but suspension is operationally available where the registrant refuses to cooperate. The principle preserves the proportionality requirement while recognizing that registrant cooperation is a precondition for less restrictive alternatives.
The COVID-19 era produced a significant body of discipline jurisprudence. Trozzi, Luchkiw, Kilian, Kustka, and others have together produced a substantial corpus of doctrine on the limits of physician expression during a public health emergency, the boundaries of medical exemption practice, the framework for regulatory cooperation, and the proportionality of disciplinary responses. The jurisprudence will be a reference point for future public health emergencies and for any other context in which physician conduct departs substantially from professional norms.
Substantial procedural duration is the norm for contested discipline matters. The Kilian arc ran from October 2021 to October 2025. Contested discipline proceedings with constitutional dimensions can take years. Interim orders frequently operate throughout the entire period as the effective regulatory response.
Why this case matters
For physicians. The regulatory framework requires cooperation. Constitutional and jurisdictional arguments are available but must be brought through the proper forum (the Discipline Committee at first instance, judicial review on the back end) and do not provide a defence to refusal to produce records during the investigation phase. The cost of refusal can substantially exceed the cost of compliance, even where the underlying conduct under investigation might have produced a less severe sanction on its own.
For patients. Patient personal health information is protected by PHIPA, not by the physician’s invocation of Charter section 8. The patient’s rights of access, correction, and complaint are independent of any disciplinary process and operate through the Information and Privacy Commissioner. Patients whose records are produced in a CPSO investigation are protected by the statutory framework that governs the regulatory use of the information; the framework is not a free pass for public disclosure of clinical information.
For regulatory practice. The case provides a clean Ontario authority on the custodian-subject distinction in the section 8 context. It is likely to be cited in future discipline proceedings where members assert privacy or constitutional objections to production demands. The pattern of doctrinal coverage in the COVID-era cases (Trozzi, Luchkiw, Kilian, Kustka) provides a reasonably comprehensive reference for future cases involving the “ungovernable physician” framework.
For other regulated professions. The framework is not specific to physicians. The same regulatory architecture exists for other regulated health professions in Ontario, with each profession’s College operating under the RHPA framework. The custodian-subject distinction, the duty of cooperation, the section 87 framework, and the ungovernable-professional framework all translate. The case has implications for nurses, dentists, pharmacists, midwives, and other regulated professionals as well.
For prospective clients considering complaints to the CPSO. If you are considering bringing a complaint to the CPSO about a physician, the framework above describes the steps the College will take. For practical guidance on the complaint process, including which regulatory body to approach for which kind of issue, see A Patient’s Guide to Making Complaints About Health Care in Ontario and CPSO Complaints: Should I Make a Formal Complaint Against My Doctor? (if the latter has been published).
Cluster integration
COVID-era physician discipline (now four cases):
- Trozzi (revocation; the “ungovernable physician” framework articulated)
- Luchkiw (substantial suspension)
- Kilian (12-month suspension after refusal-to-cooperate findings; the PHIPA custodian-subject distinction)
- Kustka (penalty decision June 2025)
The “ungovernable physician” doctrine cluster:
- Trozzi (principal articulation; revocation as ultimate sanction for non-cooperation)
- Kilian (the application in the production-motion context)
The PHIPA framework cluster:
- Mercado (general PHIPA framework)
- Martin v HPARB (PHIPA framework in regulatory context)
- Kilian (the custodian-subject distinction in Charter section 8 analysis)
The regulatory framework cluster:
- A Patient’s Guide to Making Complaints About Health Care in Ontario (patient-facing complaint guidance)
- Trozzi (the framework in the physician-facing penalty context)
- Kilian (the framework in the production-of-records context)
Decision Date: October 16, 2024 (OPSDT motion ruling). Subsequent merits findings: March 5, 2025 (Kustka); May 2, 2025 (Kilian). Penalty decisions: June 17, 2025 (Kustka); October 22, 2025 (Kilian, 12-month suspension).
Jurisdiction: Ontario Physicians and Surgeons Discipline Tribunal.
Principal citation: College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v Kilian, 2024 ONPSDT 23 (CanLII)
Related citations: Kilian v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2024 ONCA 52 (the s. 87 framework); Kilian v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 2829 (interim order patient harm framework).
Outcome: Joint motion of Dr. Kilian and Dr. Kustka to resist production of patient records dismissed. The OPSDT held that physicians have no Charter section 8 privacy interest in their patients’ records (the patients hold the privacy interest as PHIPA subjects, not the physicians as custodians). Other constitutional arguments rejected. Subsequent merits findings produced professional misconduct findings against both physicians. Penalty decisions imposed substantial consequences including a 12-month suspension for Dr. Kilian commencing October 23, 2025.
Key authorities: Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 (Charter section 8 framework); Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, SO 2004, c 3, Sched A (PHIPA framework); Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 18 (RHPA framework); Health Professions Procedural Code, ss 25.4, 75-76, 87 (statutory framework); Kilian v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2024 ONCA 52 (s. 87 scope); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 8.
